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ABSTRACT
Hypersonic air-breathing propulsion utilizing scram-
jets can fundamentally change transatmospheric ac-
celerators for low Earth-to-orbit and return trans-
portation. The value and limitations of ground
tests, of flight tests, and of computations are pre-
sented, and scramjet development requirements are
discussed. It is proposed that near full-scale hyper-
sonic propulsion flight tests are essential for develop-
ing a prototype hypersonic propulsion system and for
developing computational-design technology so that
it can be used for designing this system. In order to
determine how these objectives should be achieved,
some lessons learned from past programs are pre-
sented. A conceptual two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO)
prototype/experimental aerospace plane is recom-
mended as a means of providing access-to-space and
for conducting flight tests. A road map for achieving
these objectives is also presented.
1. INTRODUCTION
Revolutionary rather than evolutionary changes in
propulsion methods are most likely to lead to
progress in transportation (Ref. 1); and propulsion
is the most important pacing technology for advanc-
ing the maximum speed at which air-breathing pi-
loted flight vehicles can fly. Hypersonic air-breathing
propulsion utilizing scramjets or supersonic combus-
tion ramjets can fundamentally change transatmo-
spheric accelerators and atmospheric cruisers. A
strategy is discussed here for bringing about this rev-
olution.
As an Earth-to-orbitand returntransportationsys-
tem, the multi-stagedspace shuttlewas successfully
developed by using all-rocketpropulsion. However,
furtheradvancements in thistype of propulsionwill
yieldonly small improvements inperformance, since
rocketperformance has been advanced closeto theo-
reticalimits.Air-breathingpropulsionwith a rocket
assist significantly reduces gross takeoff weight for
a given payload and substantially increases mission
flexibility vis-g-vis those offered by all-rocket propul-
sion in vertical takeoff vehicles. Rocket systems
require much larger propellant mass fractions, re-
suiting in smaller empty mass and payload mass,
and provide smaller weight growth margins for the
same percentage increase in dry weight than do air-
breathing/rocket systems. Consequently, the former
have limited potential for large payload mass frac-
tions. Rocket propulsion can provide boost-glide,
but this is unacceptable for hypersonic cruisers. Al-
though air-breathing/rocket systems require about
50% more ideal velocity (energy) to achieve orbit
than do all-rocket systems, the factor-of-2 advantage
offered by the air-breathing/rocket systems in terms
of effective specific impulse more than compensates
for their increased drag and gravity losses (Ref. 2).
Air-breathing propulsion provides for higher over all
performance and far greater operability than that
possible with all-rocket propulsion.
Making significant improvements in mass fraction
and margin and developing fully reusable vehicles
are the main challenges for the rocket designers;
making operational scramjets over the complete air-
breathing hypersonic range is the prime challenge for
the designers of air-breathing system. The develop-
ment of both propulsion options should be pursued
The development of prototype/operational systenm
requiresthe effectiveand efficientuse ofproven com-
putationaltools,as well as appropriate ground and
flightests.Computational toolsincludesimple tools
or engineeringtools,computational fluiddynamics
(CFD) tools,and computational structuraldynam-
ics (CSD) tools. In turn, these tools need models
of physicaland chemical (natural)phenomena, and
models of increments (deltas)when absolute values
ofpertinentquantitieseithercannot be predictedor
can be predictedonly at an impracticalcost.
These models are validatedby researchand develop-
ment (R&D) activitiesconducted with ground and
flighttests.Research testsare well-definedand con-
trolled,are generallyhighlyinstrumented, are aimed
at high-resolutiondata, are carriedout (usually)
with small-scaletest models, and have short test
times. These testshelp us understand phenomena
relatedto the development and validationof compu-
tationalmodels. Development testsare conducted
forparametric trade-offstudieswith subscaleor near
full-scale subcomponents and components. Research
and development tests thus provide the database for
design. Test and evaluation (T&E) or qualification
activities with ground tests are used to validate the
overall design of a system or subsystem hardware to
assure that it will perform as expected in flight. The
qualification is done in terms of performance, op-
erability, and durability near or at flight conditions.
Test articles are usually large scale and the test times
are relatively long.
Existing ground test facilities and test techniques are
inadequate for developing a scramjet R&D database
and for qualifying air-breathing propulsion modules
utilizing scramjets (Refs. 3-5); they are adequate
only in a perfect gas environment. Current vitiated
air facilities that can accommodate relatively large-
scale components operate in the Mach number range
below 8. Higher Mach number facilities provide only
partial flow simulation and either operate for short
test times or are too small. Subscale modules and
components can be tested to about Mach 12 in arc
facilities, to roughly Mach 15 in shock tunnels, and
up to Mach 22+ in impulse facilities. These facili-
ties are suitable for limited research testing. Large-
size engine modules can be tested up to a true tem-
perature Mach number of 3.8 in clean (non-vitiated)
continuous-flow air for qualification testing and up to
about Mach 8 with vitiated air in blowdown (shorter
duration) facilities for development testing. With
present measurement techniques (Refs. 6-8), the
level of uncertainty in performance measurements
generally increases with increasing hypersonic free-
stream Mach number, M0, making their use in de-
sign development processes increasingly uncertain.
For example, see Ref. 9 for uncertainties in mea-
surements of inlet performance and the sensitivity
of the engine specific impulse to these uncertainties.
Moreover, the cost and complexity of tests increase
as Mach numbers increase.
New facilities can be built and new or improved test
techniques can be developed to overcome some of
these current testing deficiencies, but that would re-
quire 7-12 years, even given existing new technologies
(Ref. 3). If the needed technologies must be devel-
oped, an additional 10 years (estimated) would be
required before facility design could begin. Another
choice for developing hypersonic propulsion system
is to conduct a flight-test program.
Testing of new concepts, designs, and systems in
flight is as fundamental as testing in ground facilities.
Neither ground-test data obtained at flight condi-
tions nor computational models based on these data,
can give all the answers related to a true flight envi-
ronment. Flight tests can be used to verify and cab
ibrate/correct ground-test data and computational
results, and can be used to validate and develop corn-
putational models. Flight testing plays the essential
role in ensuring that all the elements of a vehicle are
satisfactorily integrated. Qualification flight testing
is done to verify the complete system performance,
operability, and durability, and to identify critical
problems, to flush out unanticipated unknowns, and
to establish the flight envelope.
Although development programs can be conducted
in flight, research tests are difficult or impossible to
carry out in flight: flight environmental conditions
can be neither completely controlled nor defined, and
the quality and quantity of data are generally not as
good as can be obtained in ground facilities. More-
over, flight tests can be risky and they are expensive.
There are numerous examples of flight data being at
variance with ground-test data and with computed
results. Either flight tests, or ground tests, or com-
putations, taken alone, are inadequate for developing
new concepts or new prototypes. The aerospace ve-
hicle development quartet - design, computations,
ground tests, and flight tests - is required (Fig. 1).
Figure 1. The aerospace vehicle
development quartet.
Hypersonic propulsion flight tests are essential to
the realizat:_on of the propulsion revolution offered
by the scr_mjet cycle. The objectives of flight
tests are to assemble databases for developing pro-
totype/operational propulsion systems and to gather
data for developing computational-design technology
and for corroborating ground test data. But how
should these tests be conducted? In the sections that
follow, an attempt is made to answer this question,
the requirements for developing this propulsive cycle
are discussed, relevant lessons are drawn from past
hypersonic and non-hypersonic programs, a strat-
egy is propc_ed for achieving this revolution, and a
conceptual flight-test vehicle is recommended. The
requirements for developing computational-design
technology and a road map for achieving this de-
velopment are presented.
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2. SCRAMJETDEVELOPMENTREQUIREMENTS
The propulsion system of a single-stage-to-orbit
(SSTO) transatmospheric accelerator consists of (1)
a low-speed propulsion system for acceleration from
takeoff to a free-stream speed of about Mach (M0)
3, (2) a combined-cycle or a dual-mode engine that
operates in a ramjet mode from M0 "" 3 to about
M0 -- 6 and in a scramjet mode from M0 = 6-t- to
M0 - 23-i-, and (3) a rocket system to assist the low-
speed system, to achieve orbit, and to maneuver on-
orbit/de-orbit. At free-stream speeds above Mach
3, the entire vehicle underbody, excluding wings
and control surfaces but including the engine, is the
propulsion system. The forebody underneath the ve-
hicle is used to compress, decelerate, and direct the
required airflow into the engine, which consists of an
air inlet, an air duct (isolator), fuel injectors, burn-
ers, and an exit nozzle. Inside the engine, the air is
further compressed, is subsequently mixed with fuel,
and is ignited and burned. The combustion products
exit the engine and expand along the underneath af-
terbody to provide thrust.
A strong coupling/integration between the propul-
sive flow field and the aerodynamic flow field and
between different components of the propulsive sys-
tem leads to a sensitivity-intensive vehicle, with the
level of integration and of the sensitivity increas-
ing as M0 increases along the air-breathing corri-
dor. For example, the expected performance of the
scramjet at moderate and high M0 may require con-
trol of the angles of attack or sideslips within 0.1 o .
(Low, moderate, and high hypersonic free-stream
Mach numbers ranges are defined, respectively, as
M0 = 5+ to M0 = 10; M0 - 10+ to M0 = 18; and
M0 = 18+ to M0 = 24.) Development of such a
propulsion system is a strongly integrated multidis-
ciplinary/multitechnology process.
The feasibility and operability of the air-breathing
hypersonic propulsion system are key developments
required for building transatmospheric accelerators.
The entire propulsion system must be carefully de-
signed to achieve the desired propulsive performance
under all expected flight conditions. There are a
number of formidable design challenges. First, an
optimum performance is a design goal for each type
of propulsion system in its operational Mach number
range. Second, smooth transition is required from
the low-speed system to the ramjet propulsion cycle
or from the ramjet cycle to the scramjet propulsion
cycle or from the scramjet cycle to the rocket system.
Third, the efficient and reliable control of the ther-
mal environment is necessary, with active fuel cooling
of the propulsion system during the ramjet/scramjet
operation. Fourth, the different propulsive systems
need to be integrated in a way that does not degrade
their individual performances when they are active
and that keeps their individual weights and complex-
ities acceptable. Fifth, some common components
among different propulsion systems and some com-
ponents of the same system need to be in-flight vari-
able for efficient use at each flight condition.
On one hand, it is propulsion system performance
at moderate/high M0 that will ultimately determine
the success or failure of the transatmospheric accel-
erator. On the other hand, the compromises made
to ensure the proper propulsion system performance
at moderate/high M0 must also permit adequate
propulsion system performance below Mach 6. The
propulsion system for the cruiser is a fall-out of the
development of the propulsion system for the accel-
erator; hut the converse is not true.
There are three essential issues related to the ramjet-
scramjet propulsion system. The first is whether the
engine will perform as expected when integrated with
the forebody and the afterbody, that is, with the
airframe. Only when the engine is integrated with
the airframe does engine performance have a useful
meaning. The second issue is whether the inlet, the
isolator duct, the burner, and the nozzle will per-
form as their individual tests indicate after they are
integrated into an engine. The third issue is the ef-
fect of one engine module or flow path on another
engine module, that is, the module-to-module inter-
action on the operability and the reliability of the
engine, caused by forebody and afterbody flow dis-
tortions or by unstart of one of the engine modules.
Related to this third issue is the issue of vehicle con-
trollability. These issues may not be answered fully
without flight tests, because neither the full-scale ve-
hicle nor the full-scaie engine - nor its most crucial
and least understood component, the burner - can
be tested in existing ground test facilities at crucial
flight conditions and credibly analyzed with compu-
tational tools.
During ramjet operation and during scramjet oper-
ation at low- and moderate-hypersonic free-stream
speeds, combustion takes place at subsonic speeds
and supersonic speeds, respectively. When speeds
approach Mach 18, hypersonic combustion takes
place. In the latter case, the burner entrance flow
is at a hypersonic Mach number (Mach> 5) and the
burner bulk flow remains hypersonic throughout the
fuel injection, mixing, ignition, and burning process.
In the burner there is a strong interaction and syner-
gism between the fuel, fuel injectors, and the burner
configuration, with a number of issues related to
each one of them. Temperature, kinetics, mixing,
and ignition are issues associated with the fuel. The
injection scheme, mixing enhancement and control,
axial momentum, and thermal protection are prob-
lems related to fuel injectors. Entrance flow condi-
tions; area ratio and distribution; length; wall fric-
tion, heat transfer, and reactivity; mixing; turbu-
lence; chemistry; finite-strength shock waves; flow
separation; are concerns regarding burner configura-
tions. The issues of turbulence, mixing, and combus-
tion at moderate and high Mach numbers are signifi-
cant and currently confound theoretical understand-
ing. Flows with hypersonic combustion differ from
those with supersonic combustion in that the effects
of heat release through combustion are smaller. It is
also known that turbulence can create random shock
waves and intermittent zones of chemical reaction.
Burners are designed to attain the highest perform-
ing, lightest weight, lowest cost, and most durable
and reliable burner. Different priorities are placed
on each of these design requirements for different
applications. Just from the point of view of perfor-
mance, burner designs differ at low-, moderate-, and
high-hypersonic flight Mach numbers. For example,
in order to enhance fuel penetration, the fuel injec-
tion angle can be normal to the airflow at M0 < 10;
but this angle need to approach the flow direction
as the high-Mach range is approached, because the
axial momentum of the fuel is a major contributor
to engine thrust (Ref. 10).
Although the rocket propulsion increasingly con-
tributes to the net thrust at speeds approaching the
orbital speed, the scramjet system is operational un-
til just before this speed is achieved. The operation
of the latter system ought to assist rather than ham-
per the contribution of the former. This requirement
makes the understanding of hypersonic combustion
phenomena as significant as that of supersonic com-
bustion.
Hypersonic propulsion testing requires test condi-
tions for proper chemical reactions, mixing, bound-
ary layers, shock-wave patterns, and near full-size
hardware. It is necessary to duplicate the primitive
variables, including gas composition, at the burner
entrance and at the sides of the burner that are likely
to occur in flight, so that the combustion chemistry
is correctly reproduced. This is explained as follows.
Damk6hler's first number is proportional to a prod-
uct of Reynolds number and is a function of temper-
ature and velocity. This relation requires matching
of Mach number (the ratio of kinetic energy to ther-
mal energy), Reynolds number (the ratio of inertial
forces to viscous forces), and Damk/_hler's numbers
(the ratio of flow transit time through the burner to
chemical reaction time and the ratio of heat added
by reaction to the stagnation enthalpy of the inviscid
flow) (Ref. 11). Hence, the burner length is deter-
mined by chemical kinetics, and it is non-scalable. If
the needed burning length is shortened, performance
results for subscale models of engines are subject to
large errors.
There are three approaches to conducting tests. In
the first method, there is a duplication of the flight
values of certain well-known dimensionless groups,
namely, simulation parameters leading to the test-
ing of subscale models. In the second method, the
propulsion system is decomposed into testable units
using control volumes and reference planes (cf. Ref.
12). This approach requires the matching and sim-
ulation of at least the upstream and lateral bound-
ary conditions at these interfaces of testable units
or components. In the third method, ground tests
are used to define incremental effects to a well-
established baseline (Ref. 8). However, these three
approaches are of limited use for developmental test-
ing of the moderate- and high-speed, hypersonic air-
breathing propulsion system.
Scaling issues and interface simulation issues for
flight tests are no different from those for ground
tests. As the scale of the system is reduced, the
quality and quantity of useful test data gathered are
less, and more of the phenomena observed in the near
full-scale propulsive system are less observable in the
subscale systems (cf. Ref. 13).
There are two principal scaling issues (Fig. 2). First,
performance and operability of the subscale design
are different from those of the full-scale. These dif-
ferences may lead to the development of inappropri-
ate computational models for full-scale applications.
Photographic scaling of a full-scale propulsion sys-
tem or of a component can result in a system or
a component that does not function. The photo-
graphically scaled test article is invariably modified
because of some of the following reasons: manufac-
turability, functionality, performance, preservation
of "full-scal,_" natural phenomena and of "nearly the
same" flow conditions, instrumentation, cost, and
timeliness. For example, manufacturability of lead-
ing edges aad fuel injectors limits the smallness of
these devices. The changing of fuel temperature af-
fects fuel-air mixing, ignition and reaction rates, fuel
thrust, and the fuel-to-air equivalence ratio (the ra-
tio of the actual fuel-to-air flow ratio to the stoichio-
metric - the fuel flow required to burn all the oxygen
present in tlae air - fuel-to-air ratio).
The second principal scaling issue is the traceability
of natural phenomena and representative flow condi-
tions in subseale articles to those likely to occur in
full-scale articles. A functional subscale article may
either manifest phenomena other than those likely
to occur in the full-scale article or manifest the same
phenomena but produce flow conditions vastly dif-
ferent from those in the full-scale article. Along the
propulsive tlow path, scaling can, for example, af-
fect phenontena related to the transition from lam-
inar to turbulent flow; entropy layer; viscous layer;
shock-wave and boundary-layer interaction; shock-
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shock interaction; low density effects; chemical ki-
netics; mixing; ignition; interactions between chem-
ical reactions and turbulence; surface conditions in
terms of materials, temperature, and roughness; and
transition from turbulent to laminar flow. A lack of
traceability also affects the development of appropri-
ate computational models.
• Leading-edge radius
• Location of bow shock
• Boundary layer stability
• Drag
• Heat transfer
• Thermal survivability
Flow
• Inlet kinetic energy efficiency
• Fuel injector geometry
• Base pressure
• Reaction/residence time
• Ignition delay
• Fuel-to-air equivalence ratio
Figure 2. Some effects of scaling on
design and natural phenomena.
The reference-plane approach is difficult to use for
the complete development of individual components.
Unprecedented attention is required to details of the
various phenomena that are likely to occur along the
propulsion flow path and to the integration of these
phenomena between components. Only a small num-
ber of high-level decisions can be made concerning
the overall design philosophy. Once these decisions
are made, the design of components evolves to sup-
port the initial decisions.
There are two main challenges involved in the
reference-plane approach for component qualification
testing. First, interface boundary conditions must be
simulated with a high level of fidelity; otherwise, this
approach introduces uncertainties that may cast seri-
ous doubts on the outcome of testing. When such an
accurate simulation is not feasible or practical, which
is almost always the case, different sets of interface
boundary conditions encompassing the required set
of conditions need to be simulated, and the sensitiv-
ity of these simulated sets to the performance of the
testable unit is determined. At moderate and high
M0, the burner or the nozzle entrance conditions are
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to completely
simulate and test in present ground-test facilities.
Simulations of these conditions without other rele-
vant components in flight tests are either even more
difficult or impossible.
Second, net propulsive thrust cannot be measured in
ground tests. In principle, a force-accounting proce-
dure can first assess the performance of each testable
unit and then determine the performance of the corn-
plete propulsion system. The measurement of com-
ponent performance is not a trivial task (Ref. 9).
Net thrust is a small difference between a large gross
thrust and a large gross drag. Even errors of the or-
der of 1% to 2% can introduce significant uncertainty
in determining net thrust. Further, energy require-
ments will preclude building a facility large enough to
test the complete propulsion system. Consequently,
net thrust can be measured only in flight.
The incremental approach provides increments that
account for the various modeling shortcomings that
preclude a test at flight conditions. These increments
are added to a properly characterized baseline flow.
This approach for developing the burner, particu-
larly, at moderate- and high-hypersonic Mach num-
bers requires new ground facilities and the develop-
ment of enhanced, that is, having smaller uncertain-
ties, nonintrusive flow-diagnostic techniques.
The principal scramjet developmental challenge is in
the Mach number range from Mach 10 to 23+. The
development of a prototype transatmospheric accel-
erator leading to a fleet of operational vehicles re-
quires a demonstration of net scramjet thrust across
the complete hypersonic Mach number range, verifi-
cation and validation of computational-design tools,
and verification in an actual vehicle of the tech-
nologies and systems needed for such vehicles. The
latter requirement includes items such as those re-
lated to vehicle controllability, structural and sub-
system weights, integrity, and survival, and thermal-
environment controllability. These requirements go
far beyond research inquiry concerning hypersonic
air-breathing propulsion and technology demonstra-
tions in individual propulsive components.
Until more becomes known, these requirements can
be only partially met with a subscale propulsion sys-
tem. For fulfilling all of these requirements, either
near-full-scale systems or at least two and (prefer-
ably three) appreciably different size subscale sys-
tems should be tested so that extrapolation to near-
full scale can be done with a high level of confidence.
3. LESSONS DRAWN FROM PAST PROGRAMS
In the United States, the X-series of vehicles have
been tested in flight mainly in order to understand
and demonstrate new design concepts and to explore
new flight regimes (Ref. 14). In the past, such ac-
tivities led to two major contributions: development
of supersonic flight technology and an understand-
ing of the problems of flight out of the atmosphere
and of lifting entry into the atmosphere from orbit.
Many minor contributions have also resulted from
the flight tests of these vehicles. Note that the de-
signs and operations of these vehicles required rela-
tively minimal integration of propulsion and aerody-
namics.A lessondeducedfromflight-testprograms
is that flight testingis donewith limitedobjectives
overa relatively narrow spectrum of unknown nat-
ural phenomena primarily related to either aerody-
namics, or aerothermodynamics, or propulsion.
The reusable, unpiloted X-7 plane (which set a speed
record of Much 4.31) was designed to serve as a
ramjet engine testbed. This plane was boosted to
ramjet ignition speed before the reusable ramjet en-
gine was started. A large ramjet database with
three different size, pod-mounted engines was col-
lected. This database is still the foundation of re-
lated ramjet investigations and developments. The
X-7 program demonstrated that a series of flight tests
with reusable flight vehicles and testbeds provides
the most productive experimental flight program.
The reusable, piloted, rocket-powered X-15 plane,
which was launched from a B-52 bomber, was the
most successful of all the X-planes. One hundred
and ninety-nine flights were conducted with three
planes. A majority of the X-15 flights were in the
Much 5 to 6 range, and 1 hour of flying time was
accumulated at speeds above Much 5; on four occa-
sions the vehicle speed exceeded Much 6, but over a
total of only 6 minutes. From the X-15 program we
learned (1) that what may be minor and unimpor-
tant aspects of a subsonic or supersonic plane can be
major design problems in a hypersonic plane (Ref.
15); (2) that robustness/margins are necessary for
hypersonic experimental planes (l_f. 14); and (3)
that a test program in which numerous flight tests
are conducted in a unknown region with reusable,
modifiable, and piloted flight vehicles can provide a
wealth of new information that can be used in devel-
oping new technologies and concepts.
The first aerospace X-plane program, Dyna-Soar (X-
20), was started in October 1957 with an objective
of developing in three steps a piloted vehicle for or-
bital military uses. This program was twice redi-
rected before being finally redirected in December
1961. The final objectives were the development in
one step of an orbital experimental glider for piloted
maneuverable entry from orbit, extensive exploration
of the hypersonic flight regime to solve design prob-
lems associated with controlled entry, and horizon-
tal landing at a designated location (Ref. 16). Ap-
parently, there was a bureaucratic failure to provide
an understanding of the possible space missions and
economical advantages of Dyna-Soar vis-g-vis other
options. In December 1963, this program was can-
celled. At the time of cancellation, $410 million had
been spent; 7,670 people were involved; 14,000 hr
of wind-tunnel tests had been conducted; 11 million
man-hours out of a total of 16 million man-hours had
been spent in engineering; and the first flight was an
estimated $373 million away (Ref. 16). The lessons
to be drawn from this program are the following: (1)
a lack of a clear program definition and of the ul-
timate purpose of the program is detrimental to its
health and survival; and (2) when a choice is made
between economics and technology demonstration,
the former wins. A program is selected on the basis
of the return it promises on investment. A corol-
lary is that a major program should offer short-term
benefits.
The second aerospace X-plane program, the Na-
tional Aerospace Plane (NASP) (X-30), was begun in
February 1986. The objectives of this program were
single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO), air-breathing propul-
sion at hypersonic speeds, hypersonic cruise, horizon-
tal takeoff and landing from conventional length run-
ways, powered approach to landing and go-around,
and aircraft-like operability. The NASP program
was redirected by the Space Council directive in June
1989 to develop and demonstrate hypersonic tech-
nologies with an ultimate goal of SSTO, with the
performance of the X-30 constrained to the minimum
necessary to meet the highest priority research, as
opposed to operational objectives, and with the pro-
gram conducted in such a way to minimize technical
and cost uncertainties. This program was terminated
in October 1994 after approximately $2.4 billion had
been spent by the U.S. government and NASP con-
tractors.
The NASP program is replaced by the Hypersonic
System Technology Program (HySTP) for ground-
test and flight-test activities to demonstrate scramjet
performance and validate computer codes for com-
puting this performance. Apparently, this program is
constrained with a design-to-cost requirement lead-
ing to a single-point-design testbed. Very few flight
tests at speeds of about Much 15 are being contem-
plated for testing roughly one-eighth scale scramjets
mounted on surplus missile boosters. It should be
observed that the success or failure of this program
cannot establish the feasibility and the operability of
a near-full-.._cale hypersonic air-breathing propulsion
system for an aerospace plane.
A postmortem examination of the NASP program
would reve:d many lessons, among which two are of
paramount importance. The first is that depend-
ing in a major way on a single unproven technology
for designing a vehicle over a significant portion of
its flight envelope is indeed an adventuresome design
philosophy. In the mid-1980s, advances in propul-
sion, in material and thermal management, and in
CFD and the necessity of flight tests to demonstrate
structural and thermal designs with full-size articles
and to solve problems associated with such designs
were used to technically justify the initiation of the
X-30 program. Whenever ground-test data were not
available at flight conditions, CFD was assumed to
betheprincipalmeans of assessing the X-30's per-
formance and for understanding various phenomena.
Apparently, this assumption was a mistake. Over
about 70% of the X-30 flight envelope this depen-
dence on CFD was necessary.
Computations are based on models for natural phe-
nomena and for increments. Validation of these mod-
els requires test data. Obviously, computed results
obtained with unvalidated models introduce uncer-
tainties, risks, and conservatism which may be un-
acceptable. In the absence of test data, the level of
credibility of CFD results can be established by the
use of uncertainty analysis (Ref. 1T). This approach
is taken, for example, in the nuclear field (Ref. 18).
This utility of uncertainty analysis in the aerospace
field is yet to be developed. Thus, the credibility of
a design is no better than the credibility of the tools
used in the design; and computation-design technol-
ogy is not complete enough in itself to be used as a
design tool.
The second principal lesson to be learned from the
NASP program is that a vehicle that departs radi-
cally from all its predecessors - by exhibiting a wide
range of known and unknown phenomena, by pre-
senting unprecedented obstacles in the integration of
aerodynamics and propulsion, by allowing little mar-
gin of error, and by lacking necessary circumstantial
evidence for validating its design before flight tests -
is exceedingly hard to design. If a vehicle of a highly
questionable design is built, the flight testing of it
over a large Mach number range is an extremely dif-
ficult, risky, and even foolhardy task. It is prudent
to assume that the design of such a vehicle, specif-
ically of its propulsion system, will change signifi-
cantly more than once during the flight-test program,
and such changes are very costly. Please note that
(1) there is a substantial difference between all-rocket
propulsion and air-breathing propulsion in terms of
the natural phenomena likely to be encountered on
the way to orbit and in terms of design; (2) the mod-
ifications that the X-7 and X-15 planes went through
were relatively minor; and (3) the design of the X-30
was not able to achieve orbit (Ref. 19). This les-
son is a direct consequence of a premature program
requirement, namely, the SSTO capability.
The foremost objective of the NASP program was the
SSTO capability. The initial selection of and the sub-
sequent adherence to this objective were apparently
ill-advised. This objective could have been dropped
following the 1989 Space Council's directive or by
heeding a prudent rule such as that established for
the Skunk Works by Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson,
namely, that the outfit's "reputation for integrity
would gain more business than [the outfit] would ever
lose by turning away questionable ventures" (Ref.
20). In 1984, the U.S. Air Force Space Command
had determined that in the mid-1990s the projected
technology required for a SSTO vehicle would not
be available, but that required for developing a two-
stage-to-orbit (TSTO) vehicle would be available
(Ref. 21). A RAND report has argued that there
are no clearly compelling mission-related reasons for
developing operational SSTO aerospace planes (Ref.
22). In December 1992, the U.S. General Accounting
Office recommended a re-examination of the worth of
pursuing SSTO on its own merit (Ref. 19). Regard-
ing the X-30 program, Ben Rich wrote the following:
"But long before the serious dollar is plonked down,
someone in charge had better realize that Reagan's
'Orient Express' is really two separate concepts - one
a rocketship and the other an airplane. Most likely,
that particular twain shall never meet successfully"
(Ref. 20).
The Dyna-Soar program and the NASP program
provide a reaffirmation of Apollo-era NASA Admin-
istrator James Webb's requirement, that of develop-
ing a working consensus. There must be a consensus
in the technical and political communities beyond
those directly involved with the program. Before and
continuously after the initiation of the NASP pro-
gram there were serious doubts about the program's
technical feasibility and cost estimates among people
with no direct interest in the program.
The Apollo program - landing men on the Moon -
was estimated to cost $13 billion. However, James
Webb inflated this figure and presented to the U.S.
Congress a figure of $20 billion (Ref. 23). This pro-
gram was done on time and within budget. In con-
trast, significant cuts were made in the budget for
the shuttle program in order to get it started. These
cuts affected its design and its operational costs. A
lesson that can be noted is that the design-to-cost
philosophy keeps a program alive but ends up cost-
ing more in the long run.
The Apollo program had considered three principal
methods of a piloted lunar landing: the direct ascent,
the Earth-orbital rendezvous, and the lunar-orbital
rendezvous. The latter was chosen and was a great
success, but it also ensured that the program would
be a dead end. It was estimated that the lunar or-
bital rendezvous method would cost between 10% to
20% less than the other methods and that the land-
ing could be accomplished a year to a year and a half
earlier than with other techniques (Ref. 24). If the
Earth rendezvous technique had been chosen instead,
the work on deploying a space station could have be-
gun at least 10 years earlier (Ref. 25). A lesson to
be learned is that it is necessary to ask about what
follow-on programs or growth potential are planned
before discarding options and before freezing technol-
ogy prematurely. The WW II Manhattan Project is
a relevant example. Several alternatives were put-
sued simultaneously, and this "approach, as much as
anything, that enabled the United States to produce
a nuclear weapon before Germany did" (Ref. 25).
A lesson offered by a number of space-related fail-
ures, such as the space shuttle Challenger disinte-
gration right after launch, is that "reliability should
have top priority in the design of new systems, even
at the expense of greater up-front costs and lower
performance" (Ref. 26), because correcting failures
eventually costs even more.
4. A PROTOTYPE/EXPERIMENTAL PLANE
AND FLIGHT TESTS
To cut the Gordian knot of developing hypersonic
air-breathing propulsion to achieve orbit, the SSTO
requirement must be put aside for a while (Fig. 3).
The air-breathing SSTO capability should be devel-
oped after developing the air-breathing TSTO capa-
bility (Ref. 27). The air-breathing TSTO plane sig-
nificantly reduces risk, increases margin, and main-
tains the air-breathing SSTO option.
Figure 3. Two options exist for developing a
prototype air-breathing SSTO:
(1) safe and (2) risky.
Staging has the potential to increase performance
for a given technology or to deliver equal perfor-
mance and lower risk with less advanced technol-
ogy, as observed in Ref. 28. For example, TSTO
rocket vehicles have the following advantages over
SSTO rocket vehicles: (1) SSTO vehicles are charac-
terized as small-payload launchers that cannot com-
pete with the payload capability of TSTO vehicles;
and (2) SSTOs are more sensitive than two-stage ve-
hicles to weight growth.
A NASA access-to-space study has defined the fol-
lowing desired payload launching requirements of a
new piloted operational system with initial opera-
tional capability (IOC) circa 2008: carry a 20,000
to 25,000 pound-mass payload to a low-Earth-orbit
(LEO), namely, a 220 nautical mile circular orbit
inclined at 51.6 °. A possible set of the desired at-
tributes of this system are the following: provide
mission flexibility; be fully reusable; reduce life-cycle
costs, in part by dramatically reducing launch costs
with a design-to-lannch-cost philosophy; greatly im-
prove the safety of the flight crew; vastly improve op-
erability in terms of reliability, maintainability, and
supportability (RMS); and have potential for growth
in payload weight by a factor of 2 without adversely
affecting other attributes.
Mission flexibility and greatly enhanced operability
are achievable if aerospace planes have features that
approach those of aircraft. These attributes and full
reusability of aerospace planes lead to significantly
reduced operational costs, which in turn reduce the
life-cycle costs (a sum of development cost, acquisi-
tion cost, and operation cost) of a fleet of aerospace
planes. The life-cycle costs for each of the three
systems (rocket SSTO, air-breathing SSTO, and air-
breathing + rocket TSTO) considered under Option
3 of the NASA access-to-space study are similar to
those for the other two systems, if the cost-estimating
relations are based on previous airplane programs
and if these relations are modified, when necessary,
to account for the fact that aerospace planes ap-
proach rather than actually have aircraft-like oper-
ation (Ref. 28). However, the cost-estimating rela-
tions for new vehicles based on new technologies and
new operating procedures are uncertain, producing
large error bands in estimated costs (Ref. 22). More-
over, reducing launch costs from say $3,000 to $300
per pound of payload to LEO is estimated to reduce
the total cost of procuring and launching a dry space-
craft by less than 2%, because the cost of building
a spacecraft is typically much more than the cost of
launching it (Ref. 29). In the final analysis, it is the
total cost of space operations that must be reduced
rather than only the launch or life-cycle costs.
A prototype/experimental (P/X) TSTO aerospace
plane (Tab:_e I) is proposed as a means of provid-
ing access-to-space and for developing the hypersonic
air-breathir_g propulsion system. This plane consists
of a first-stage plane, the carrier, and a second-stage
plane, the orbiter. Three orbiters are developed.
The carrier and the orbiters are full-scale, are fully
reusable, are piloted, and takeoff and land horizon-
tally. The carrier uses a low-speed system with a
rocket assist and a ramjet-scramjet propulsion sys-
tem; this stage is designed to go up to M0 -- I0.
The carrier is a prototype vehicle up to M0 = 6,
and it is a demonstrator/experimental vehicle from
M0 = 6+ '_o M0 = 10. The upper Mach limit of
10 for the carrier is chosen considering the overall
simulation iiimits of current ground-test facilities.
Vehicle
Carrier
Orbiter-A
Orbiter-E
Orbiter-R
Much Range
Oto 10
8 to Orbit
8 to Orbit
6 to Orbit
Propulsion
Cycle
Low-Speed
Ram-Scram
Rocket
Scram jet
Assisted by
Rocket
Rocket
Assisted by
Scram jet
Rocket
Table 1. The characteristics of TSTO P/X-plane.
The three orbiters are the following: (1) orbiter-E
with a rocket/air-breathing propulsion system, (2)
orbiter-R with an all-rocket propulsion cycle, and
(3) orbiter-A with an air-breathing/rocket system.
Orbiter-E is designed to go from M0 = 8+ to orbit.
This orbiter is primarily rocket powered and has only
one replaceable air-breathing propulsion flow path,
with the engine being the primary replaceable com-
ponent; it is designed to fly, when required, selected
parts of orbiter-A's trajectory to orbit. The airframe
of orbiter-E is essentially the same as that of orbiter-
A. The development of the propulsion system with
orbiter-E is done in two steps, from M0 = 8+ to
M0 = 18 and from M0 = 18+ to M0 = 24. Once this
system is developed, prototype orbiter-A is built.
Orbiter-R is designed to go from M0 = 6+ to orbit.
The start oforbiter-R is chosen at Much 6+, because
the ramjet cycle is relatively well established up to
this value. The carrier is used to launch orbiter-
R with ramjet operation under the following condi-
tions: (1) before DT&E tests of the carrier are com-
pleted for speeds between Much 7 and 10; and (2) if
the scramjet fails to perform as expected. This Much
value is also chosen to build-in payload growth po-
tential up to Much 10, with the same carrier and with
the same size of orbiter-R. Orbiter-R is a prototype
vehicle. Both the carrier and orbiter-R are expected
to meet the NASA access-to-space performance re-
quirements and to do so with appropriate margins.
Since the volume of orbiter-A would be greater than
that of orbiter-R for the same payload performance,
a design compromise is required in favor of orbiter-
A. Orbiter-R would be heavier than orbiter-A, thus
requiring a stronger landing system on the carrier.
These are just a couple of design issues.
This proposal breaks up the hypersonic Math num-
ber range from M0 = 5 to 34o = 24 into three
ranges (as previously defined), low-, moderate-, and
high-Much number ranges. This breakup facilitates
the testing of the scramjet operation at the low-
hypersonic Much range with the carrier and the in-
cremental development of air-breathing propulsion
with orbiter-E at moderate- and high-hypersonic
Much numbers. This divide-and-conquer philosophy
greatly reduces flight-testing risks. Moreover, opera-
tions of the low-speed system, of the ramjet system,
and of the ramjet-scramjet transition system in the
carrier are flight qualified; and the performance of
orbiter-R is tested and evaluated.
On one hand, the reusable and operationally flexi-
ble carrier provides the vital hypersonic flight test
and access-to-space launch services capability. On
the other hand, orbiter-R provides the short-term
economical benefits by achieving orbit for space mis-
sions, while orbiter-E is used for further scramjet
development. This orbiter serves as a testbed for
conducting other experiments and developments at
high dynamic and heating loads, such as those re-
lated to full-scale structural panels and components.
Orbiter-E is the "X-15" of this proposal.
Both propulsion options, rocket and air-breathing,
are pursued. These propulsion systems and the pro-
posed vehicles open up the following future growth
potentials and multiple avenues, any one of which
may be pursued with a high level of confidence: (1)
staging of orbiter-R between M0 = 6 and M0 < 10;
(2) growth of payload as the staging Much num-
ber, M,, is increased to an optimum value with-
out changing the overall size of the orbiter; (3)
improvements in the carrier performance may in-
crease optimal M0t beyond 10; (4) replacement of
orbiter-R with orbiter-A; (5) development of an air-
breathing/rocket SSTO vehicle; (6) development of
an all-rocket SSTO vehicle; (7) development of a hy-
personic cruiser; (8) development of an unpiloted or-
biter; and (9) development of an expendable orbiter.
The TSTO concept does not take the low-speed sys-
tem to orbit as does the air-breathing/rocket SSTO
concept; and the TSTO concept takes much smaller
dry weight to orbit than either air-breathing/rocket
or all-rocket SSTO. These advantages reduce launch
costs of the TSTO concept. In optimized TSTO ve-
hicles, orbiter-A needs a lower propellant fraction
than that required by orbiter-R. An optimum M,t
reduces life-cyle costs. Orbiter-A would be more
reusable than orbiter-R (Ref. 30), which also would
reduce life-cycle costs. The development of proto-
type TSTO aerospace plane (the carrier and orbiter-
R) would evolve into an fleet of operational vehicles
earning revenue. This revenue in part would pay
for the flight tests of orbiter-E and the development
of orbiter-A. An operational fleet of TSTO vehicles
does not need to have the same number of carriers
and orbiters. This flexibility also reduces life-cycle
costs. Moreover, a number of technologies and de-
signfeatureswouldbecommonbetweenthosere-
quiredfor thecarrierandthedifferentorbiters.For
example,thecarrierand the orbiters use hydrogen as
fuel and use some of the same structures and mate-
rials. This commonality in technologies and designs
also helps to reduce the life-cycle costs.
For the reasons set forth below, the carrier and
orbiter-R can be developed with a high level of confi-
dence by about 2005: the technologies developed un-
der the NASP program; the large database available
from low-speed systems, ramjet systems, the space
shuttle orbiter and other reentry vehicles; the pos-
sible further development of some relevant technolo-
gies; the aerospace vehicle development quartet; the
available ground-test facilities; and the previously
presented three approaches to conducting tests. Be-
cause a significant portion of the evidence for estab-
lishing the credibility of the design would be direct
evidence, the level of confidence in the design of the
carrier would be quite high up to speeds of about
M0 - 5. The quantity of this type of evidence would
decrease and the level of inferred evidence would in-
crease, as M0 = 10 is approached. Primarily, the
ramjet-scramjet transition, vehicle performance at
low hypersonic Mach numbers, and full reusability
of the orbiter-R are the risk items.
Orbiter-E is not built until the hypersonic propul-
sion system performs satisfactorily in the carrier and
is well understood. While the carrier and orbiter-R
are designed, built, tested, and evaluated, Phase 1 of
a two-phase program for advancing the U.S. hyper-
sonic facility capability is carried out as suggested in
Kef. 3, and appropriate nonintrusive flow-diagnostic
technology applicable to the hypersonic environment
is developed. Flight-test data from the carrier flights
in the low hypersonic Mach number range would im-
prove computational-design technology and calibrate
ground-test data. These advances and enhancements
would help design the full-scale, experimental air-
breathing propulsion flow path for orbiter-E with a
high level of confidence in its design. Flight tests
of this truly experimental vehicle in the moderate-
and high-Mach-number ranges would result in a high
level of confidence in the design of orbiter-A.
5. COMPUTATIONAL-DESIGN TECHNOLOGY
Computational models are the backbones of the
computational-design technology. It is essential to
define conceptual designs before assessing the util-
ity of available models and developing new models,
because models are applicable with a high level of
confidence only in the domain in which they are de-
veloped and validated. The desired designs, in terms
of performances and specifications, of flight vehicles
and the natural phenomena they are likely to en-
counter, identify the possible domains in which mod-
els are needed. Ground tests are also conducted in
these domains. The computational-design technol-
ogy development efforts are guided by the goal of
minimizing technical uncertainties in the design for
the purpose of reducing risks.
The principal challenge of aerospace vehicle design
is to provide credible design computations to work
from, to assess the risk associated with the use
of those computations, and to develop design tools
(Ref. 31). The level of credibility required is deter-
mined by the degree to which system specifications,
such as takeoff gross weight (TOGW), are sensitive
to performance quantities, such as the engine specific
impulse, and in turn the degree to which performance
quantities are sensitive to design parameters and to
computational uncertainties (Ref. 32).
Among computational-design tools, computational
fluid dynamics (CFD) is an awesome tool in the
hands of ki_owledgeable designers. It may, for ex-
ample, be used in the design process in understand-
ing natural phenomena, in making trade-off studies,
in determining design sensitivities, in optimizing de-
signs, in making design evaluations, in developing
the design database, in computing increments, in
building absolute performance estimates, and in de-
veloping and calibrating simplified tools. With CFD
the designels can often address problems for which
no design experience, test-data base, or test tech-
niques exist. Computational fluid dynamics has the
potential of representing and computing the phenom-
ena associated with hypersonic, free-flight conditions
more accurately than can be done and measured in
ground-test facilities.
Computational fluid dynamics plays the following
multifaceted role in R&D tests and qualification
tests: pre-f_brication (that is, before a test model
is fabricated) and preflight computations assess the
feasibility of the proposed test program. Computa-
tional fluid _lynamics provides an understanding of
phenomena; assists in improving flow through exist-
ing test facilities; supports design activities of new fa-
cilities; predicts flow around and through test models
for the purpose of instrumentation design, precision,
and location; helps determine the type, quality, and
quantity of test data necessary; interpolates and ex-
trapolates test data to fill gaps in the test database;
assists in the design of model support and other test
devices and assesses their interference effects; and
helps in fornmlating the relevant test matrix. Thus,
CFD collabcrations enhance the credibility and use-
fulness of grc,und and flight tests, reduce costs of con-
ducting these tests, and enhance confidence levels for
safely expanding flight envelopes.
By definition a simulation, either with computations
or in ground-test facilities, is not the reality of flight.
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A simulation is acceptable if it reproduces the re-
ality to the level required for a specific utilization
of the simulation. The departure of the simulation
from the reality is an error in the simulation. An
estimate of this error is the uncertainty in this sim-
ulation. Sources of uncertainties unique to compu-
tations are a lack of equivalence between theoretical
and computational problems, unsatisfactory compu-
tational accuracy, and improper modeling of phe-
nomena, whereas sources of uncertainties unique to
tests are the insufficiency of measurements and un-
satisfactory measurement accuracy. Computations
and tests also have common sources of uncertain-
ties, which are owing to isolation of phenomena, ex-
traneous phenomena, and those attributable to the
human element. A crucial uncertainty introduced
by the latter source is caused by the phenomenon of
creative overbelief. The uncertainties of natural phe-
nomena are owing to the departure of the modeled
phenomena from reality. Sometimes a phenomenon
that ought to be there is not modeled, causing isola-
tion uncertainty. And sometimes a phenomenon that
does not occur in the real situation is modeled, caus-
ing extraneous uncertainty. Humans tend to believe
that what they have done is right. This belief cre-
ates uncertainties. Reference 17 provides examples
of various kinds of uncertainties.
Two kinds of benchmark computations are con-
ducted. The first is for assessing whether the prob-
lem is solved correctly, that is, by verifying compu-
tations. The second is for determining whether the
right problem is solved, that is, for validating compu-
tational models. There is always some uncertainty,
even if one uses validated models and verified com-
puted results, and the value of this uncertainty is
important in the design process. Validation and ver-
ification/demonstration processes are combined into
one word, "certification," for establishing the level
of credibility of the results, that is, for determin-
ing the degree to which the right problem is solved
correctly. To certify is to inform with certainty or to
attest as meeting a standard. Certification is defined
as follows: the process of evaluating a computer code
in terms of its logic, numerics, natural phenomena,
and the results to ensure compliance with specific
requirements. These requirements are specified by
the utility of the code. A road map for establishing
credibility is discussed below.
The following are the guidelines for tests. First, the
sensitivity of critical measurands and derived quan-
tities to test parameters, test instruments, etc. are
determined and various sources of uncertainties are
identified. Second, computational tools are used to
design and formulate the test to meet the objectives
of this test. Third, a provision is made for having
redundancy of data to cross-check and to verify con-
sistency. Fourth, relevant quantities at boundaries
are measured to facilitate computations. Fifth, per-
formance quantities are obtained when design-like
articles are tested. Sixth, the uncertainties in mea-
surands and derived quantities are determined. Sev-
enth, an independent evaluation of the data is done.
Eighth, some tests are repeated in the same facility
and in two other test facilities. Ninth, a documenta-
tion of all test-related activities is prepared.
The guidelines for establishing the accuracy of dis-
crete computations are the following. The number
of grid-points is doubled twice in each direction and
key results are processed using the Richardson ex-
trapolation, under the following conditions: (1) one-
and two-dimensional problems; and (2) one of the
space direction is the marching direction in three-
dimensional problems. This extrapolation is done at
at least three values of a parameter that is to be var-
ied in the application of a code, two extreme values
and a nominal value. When none of the space di-
rections is a marching direction in three-dimensional
problems, the sensitivity of the relevant computed
results to the grid size in each direction is provided.
This is an interim guideline, because of the current
limits of computing power. Moreover, computations
of propulsive flow path ought to provide the levels of
error in conserved variables. Performance quantities
can be significantly sensitive to conservation errors.
Sensitivity analysis is generally defined as the proce-
dure for determining the sensitivities of output pa-
rameters to input parameters. This analysis is a
necessary step in the uncertainty analysis, and the
results of this analysis highlight which measurand
and derived quantities in tests and which computed
quantities and integrated quantities in computations
need to be determined accurately and which quan-
tities do not require such attention. The analysis
begins by identifying output parameters. The sensi-
tivity of each of these parameters to each of the input
parameters is determined by computing the influence
coefficient of each parameter, while neglecting the
influence of the other parameters. These coefficients
are obtained by perturbing the input parameters and
obtaining the response in the output parameter.
The uncertainty analysis is generally defined as the
analysis of the effect of the uncertainties involved in
all stages of a process on the final responses. This
process may be a test process or a computational
process with the responses being test data or com-
puted results, respectively. Uncertainty analysis is a
powerful tool for locating the source of trouble in a
malfunctioning test or computation. There are two
approaches for conducting the uncertainty analysis:
experimental and computational. These approaches
are briefly presented in Ref. 17.
The computational-design technology development
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is done as follows. First, a systematic determina-
tion of the computational accuracy of performance
quantities is carried out. Second, whether the com-
puted phenomena are qualitatively satisfactory is de-
termined. Third, the modeling of a part of the phe-
nomena is validated by measurements, and the cor-
responding modeling uncertainties are determined.
Fourth, computations that are likely to be unreliable
are identified, and a sensitivity-uncertainty analysis
is performed. Fifth, the complete phenomenological
model is evaluated and the computational uncertain-
ties are quantified. The computational-design tech-
nology for a class of aerospace planes can be consid-
ered developed and ready for use as a tool only after
the computed results are compared with flight data,
and the strengths, the weaknesses, and the domain
of applicability of computational-design procedures
are established.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
1. The limitations of ground-test facilities and those
of computational-design tools and the highly inte-
grated nature of the hypersonic propulsion system
make flight tests essential for developing this system.
2. The scramjet development requirements dictate
flight tests of near-full-scale vehicles, correspond-
ing to the desired prototype/operational aerospace
planes.
3. The lessons drawn from the past program highly
recommend flight tests with reusable, modifiable, pi-
loted vehicles over a small Mach number range (a
narrow unknown region) and strongly suggest a pro-
gram formulation that would provide short-term eco-
nomical benefits, that would have growth potential,
and that should be doable.
4. An air-breathing TSTO demonstration is a pru-
dent step before an air-breathing SSTO demonstra-
tion is attempted.
5. The proposed carrier of the TSTO P/X-plane
assists the development of hypersonic air-breathing
propulsion with orbiter-E and meets the NASA
access-to-space requirements near-term with orbiter-
R. The development of the air-breathing propulsion
system leads to the development of orbiter-A.
6. This proposal offers a number of advantages. It is
technology-driven, opens up multiple future avenues,
provides short-term benefits, has built-in growth po-
tential, and is definitely doable. This proposal is a
sound strategy, a necessary condition for developing
a working consensus among relevant technical and
nontechnical communities.
7. The sensitivity-uncertainty analysis is the key to
successful application of the aerospace vehicle de-
velopment quartet - design,ground tests,compu-
tations,and flighttests.
8. Computational models cannot be validatedwith
measurements, unless uncertaintiesin the measur-
ands and in the quantitiesderivedfrom these mea-
surands are known.
9. The principal challenge for hypersonic propulsion
flight tests for developing air-breathing aerospace
planes is to provide for highly instrumented testbeds.
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